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We trace the consequences of an energy shock on the economy under two different 
monetary policy rules: a standard Taylor rule where the Fed responds to inﬂ  ation and the 
output gap; and a Taylor rule with inertia where the Fed moves slowly to the rate predicted 
by the standard rule. We show that with both sticky wages and sticky prices, the outcome 
of an inertial Taylor rule is superior to that of the standard rule, in the sense that inﬂ  ation is 
lower and output is higher following an adverse energy shock. However, if prices alone are 
sticky, things are less clear and the standard rule delivers substantially less inﬂ  ation than 
the inertial rule in the short run.FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF CLEVELAND
1
Introduction 
Before exiting an expressway, a cautious driver always signals his intention by switch-
ing on his turn signal well in advance of turning because he understands that other driv-
ers’ behavior will be affected by what they expect him do.  This commonplace behavior 
may speak metaphorically to central bank policy:  If market participants are forward-
looking, then it may be important for the central bank to signal future policy moves.
Starting in June 2004, the FOMC changed its language to indicate that existing policy 
accommodation would be removed at a “measured pace,” strongly signaling the direction 
of future Fed policy.  But why adjust partway by signaling future policy instead of going 
all the way more quickly? Likewise, why increase the federal funds rate 25 basis points 
at each of 10 policy meetings, instead of making ﬁ  ve moves of 50 basis points, or, for that 
matter, one move of 250 basis points?  What are the advantages of a measured pace?
One way to describe Fed policy is with a simple Taylor rule, according to which 
monetary policy responds to inﬂ  ation and the output gap. Clearly, the Fed does not auto-
matically adjust policy according to the prescriptions of the rule. Nevertheless, there is 
substantial empirical evidence that broad movements in the funds rate are well tracked 
by a simple Taylor rule. But this evidence also suggests that the Fed adjusts the funds 
rate much more slowly than the simple Taylor rule prescribes. That is, although funds 
rate movements are typically in the direction suggested by the rule, these movements 
are only partial; thus, it takes a series of policy moves to reach the level a simple Taylor 
rule suggests.  This type of Taylor rule is said to be inertial because it changes slowly, and 
today’s funds rate depends on yesterday’s funds rate.
One way to think about an inertial Taylor rule is that policy consists of both the 
funds rate today and the expected path of the funds rate. Without inertia, policy moves 
more immediately and does not indicate where the funds rate is likely to head.1 This 
Policy Discussion Paper shows, in the context of a standard, quantitative, dynamic new-
Keynesian model, that it is beneﬁ  cial for policy accommodation to be removed slowly 
instead of in one—or a few—large moves. That is, an inertial Taylor rule frequently deliv-
ers a better outcome than a noninertial rule. 
In particular, we trace the consequences of an energy shock on the economy under 
two different monetary policy rules: a standard Taylor rule where the Fed responds to in-
ﬂ  ation and the output gap; and a Taylor rule with inertia where the Fed moves slowly to 
the rate predicted by the standard rule. We show that with both sticky wages and sticky 
prices,  the outcome of a partial-adjustment Taylor rule is superior to that of the standard 
rule, in the sense that inﬂ  ation is lower and output is higher following an adverse energy 
shock. However, if prices alone are sticky, things are less clear and the standard rule deliv-
ers substantially less inﬂ  ation than the inertial rule in the short run.
1  Of course, even with a 
noninertial Taylor rule, one 
will anticipate future funds 
rate movements to the extent 
that future inﬂ  ation and the 
output gap are forecasted.POLICY DISCUSSION PAPERS  NUMBER 17, APRIL 2007
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The Taylor Rule
The Taylor rule has had a big impact in both monetary policy circles and academic eco-
nomic research. Figure 1 suggests why. The rule seems to track broad policy moves since 
1987 very successfully, which seems remarkable because the rule is so simple: It is set 
according to only four components: The ﬁ  rst is the Fed’s long-term inﬂ  ation target and 
the second is the “natural” or long-term real (inﬂ  ation-adjusted) federal funds interest rate.   
The sum of these ﬁ  rst two factors determines the long-run (nominal) federal funds rate, 
which amounted to 4 percent annually in Taylor’s original rule. The two remaining fac-
tors, current output and inﬂ  ation rates, address the way policy should respond to chang-
ing circumstances in the short run.
The Taylor rule prescribes that the Fed “lean against the wind” when setting interest 
rates; that is, it should raise rates when current output surpasses potential. It prescribes 
a similar response to inﬂ  ation—raise interest rates when the inﬂ  ation rate over the past 
year exceeds its long-term target. 
But mere leaning is not enough when it comes to inﬂ  ation.  Taylor cautioned that 
interest rates must rise by more than the increase in inﬂ  ation. Given that nominal in-
terest rates naturally increase one-for-one with movements in anticipated inﬂ  ation, just 
a.  Target or noninertial Taylor rule is adapted from John B. Taylor, “Discretion versus Policy Rules in 
Practice,” Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, vol. 39 (1993), pp. 195–214.
b.  Effective federal funds rate on the last day of each quarter.
c.  Partial-adjustment or inertial Taylor rule is the weighted average of the last quarter’s federal funds rate 
and the target Taylor rule.
d. The exact form of both Taylor rules comes from Sharon Kozicki “How Useful Are Taylor Rules for 
Monetary Policy?” Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, Economic Review, vol. 84 no. 2, 5–33.
Sources:  U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis; Congressional Budget Ofﬁ  ce; 
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, “Selected Interest Rates,” and Federal Reserve 
Statistical Releases, H.15; and Bloomberg Financial Information Services.
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increasing the funds rate one-for-one with inﬂ  ation is like treading water.  Therefore, the 
Fed must increase the real funds rate with inﬂ  ation to make any headway.  This more-
than-proportional response of the nominal funds rate to inﬂ  ation, known as the Taylor 
principle, therefore prescribes that the real federal funds rate should be made greater 
than the natural rate of interest whenever inﬂ  ation is above target.
In the simplest form of the rule, Taylor argued that the Fed should increase the real 
funds rate by half a percentage point for every percentage point that inﬂ  ation is above 
target or output is above potential. This implies that the nominal funds rate should in-
crease by 1.5 percent for every percentage point increase in inﬂ  ation. (Likewise, the 
Fed should decrease the real funds rate by the same amount for deviations below either 
target or potential.) Thus, Taylor felt that monetary policy (in terms of the real funds 
rate) should respond equally (in terms of the real interest rate) to inﬂ  ation and output 
deviations. But the exact weights are not crucial. Empirical evidence suggests that the 
Fed has responded to output-gap deviations (at least since 1983) a little less than Taylor 
had assumed:
io u t p u t g a p tt t
** * .. * ( ) . . =+ − + 23 2 14 4 01 5 ππ  
Figure 1 plots this rule, which goes for long periods below or above the actual funds 
rate. One reason for these long misses is that the FOMC does not change the funds rate 
as often or as dramatically as the simple Taylor rule suggests. Instead, the actual funds 
rate exhibits a lot of inertia, suggesting that an inertial Taylor rule might be a better ﬁ  t. 
Here the Fed also looks at the past funds rate in setting its target. The partial-adjustment 
(or inertial) Taylor rule is given by 
ii i t
PA
tt =+ − 07 6 0 02 4 1 .. ,
** *
where it–1 is last quarter’s funds rate (measured by the federal funds rate on the last day 
of the quarter) and i* is the target rate (the rate suggested by the Taylor rule without in-
ertia). Figure 1 also plots this inertial rule. The baseline rule without inertia is basically a 
longer-run target that provides guidance for where the funds rate will eventually end up. 
This formulation assumes that instead of moving there immediately, the Fed moves only 
24 percent of the way there each quarter. Figure 1 clearly shows that this partial-adjustment 
Taylor rule tracks the actual funds rate very closely. Another way of thinking about the partial-
adjustment formulation is that instead of reacting to today’s inﬂ  ation and output gap, the 
FOMC reacts to a weighted average of today’s and all past inﬂ  ation and output gaps.
The discussion that follows shows that with sticky prices and sticky wages, a par-
tial-adjustment Taylor rule delivers better inﬂ  ation and output outcomes than the tradi-
tional Taylor rule. This is shown in the context of an oil shock that reduces output and 
increases inﬂ  ation. POLICY DISCUSSION PAPERS  NUMBER 17, APRIL 2007
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Oil Prices and Monetary Policy: A CGE Model
To ascertain whether an inertial or noninertial Taylor rule is better, we need a calibrated 
computable general-equilibrium (CGE) model. Here we sketch the model used for our 
simulations; we describe it more fully in the appendix, along with our calibration of its 
parameters. Oil is an important input in manufacturing (and, perhaps to a lesser extent, 
in services). Oil price increases will therefore reduce output and (for a given monetary 
policy) increase prices. The rise in prices is not instantaneous, however; the evidence sug-
gests that prices are sticky and adjust slowly and that wages are sticky as well. Both these 
forms of nominal stickiness imply that output will not respond efﬁ  ciently and will differ 
from its ﬁ  rst-best level (or potential).  That is, if both prices and wages were perfectly ﬂ  ex-
ible, the output gap would be zero.
A key issue in the analysis is, of course, the statement of monetary policy. For the 
benchmark simulation, we assume that policy is given by the noninertial Taylor type de-
scribed in the previous section. For the inertial rule, we assume that policy adjusts only 
24 percent of the way to the rate predicted by the basic Taylor rule (this is the partial-
adjustment rate suggested by Kozicki, 1999).
Model Simulations
Model simulations suggest that there may be an advantage in adjusting the funds rate 
slowly. Figure 2 answers the hypothetical questions, “Holding everything else constant, 
how would inﬂ  ation, interest rates, and output be expected to behave following a one-
time 30 percent increase in oil prices? How would these variables behave if the Fed fol-
lowed a noninertial Taylor rule versus an inertial Taylor rule?” All variables are plotted as 
log deviations from trend. (For the funds rate and inﬂ  ation, these are linear deviations 
from trend.)
With both rules, the oil shock tends to increase inﬂ  ation. The Taylor rule suggests 
that policymakers raise the nominal interest rate to keep inﬂ  ation from increasing even 
more. But with inertia, this increase is smaller and spread out over time. Therefore, the 
difference between an inertial rule and noninertial rule is that the latter increases rates 
less today with a promise of future increases.  
This promise to increase rates in the future is extremely important. With inertia, the 
nominal funds rate lags behind the rule without inertia and peaks at a much lower level 
as well. The promise of future rate increases keeps inﬂ  ation lower than the noninertial 
rule as well. Surprisingly, the funds rate with inertia is always lower than the noniner-
tial Taylor rule, yet inﬂ  ation too is always lower. This is because the stance of monetary 
policy is not given by the nominal funds rate but by the real, inﬂ  ation-adjusted funds 
rate. More precisely, the policy stance is given by how much the real, inﬂ  ation-adjusted FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF CLEVELAND
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funds rate deviates from the Wicksellian interest rate (the real interest rate that would 
prevail in the economy if there were no price or wage stickiness or, equivalently, if the 
output gap were always equal to zero). By construction, therefore, the Wicksellian rate is 
the same for both the inertial and noninertial rules.
In the quarters immediately following an oil price increase, policy is much easier (the 
real rate is lower) for the inertial rule. However, this does not translate into more inﬂ  a-
tion today because in later periods, policy is expected to be tighter for the inertial rule. A 
long period in the distant future when policy is expected to be tighter more than com-
pensates (in terms of inﬂ  ation outcomes) for the shorter period of time when policy 
was substantially easier. The true stance of monetary policy, therefore, is given not only 
by the real interest rate but also by the real rate’s future path.
Although inversely related, the behavior of the output gap mirrors that of the real 
interest rate. In the beginning, the real interest rate is lower, making policy less restric-
tive than it is for the noninertial rule. Not surprisingly, output is higher and thus the 
output gap for the inertial rules during these periods. In subsequent periods, things are 
reversed. The output gap is composed of two distortions, one arising from sticky prices 
and the other from sticky wages. The output gap from sticky prices is nearly identical for 
the two rules (although a little lower for the inertial rule). It is the gap arising from sticky 
wages that drives the differences in the total output gap.  
Inﬂ  ation is a little lower in the inertial model because output and the output gap re-
sulting from sticky prices is a little lower. Another way of thinking about inﬂ  ation is that 
it is the present discounted value of all future marginal costs (the inverse of a markup). 
Current prices are determined by marginal cost, as it is today and is expected be in the 
future. A larger markup (lower marginal cost) means that output is further below its ef-
ﬁ  cient level, a negative output gap. 
Like marginal cost for sticky prices, the monopoly distortion in labor markets mea-
sures the difference between the household’s marginal rate of substitution and the real 
wage. A value of unity would mean no distortion, whereas a smaller value would imply 
a larger distortion and thus less output and the output gap. Analogous to inﬂ  ation, wage 
inﬂ  ation is the present discounted value of all these future deviations. This distortion is 
what drives the differences in the output gap between the inertial and noninertial Tay-
lor rule simulations. Nominal wage inﬂ  ation driven by differences in real wage growth 
is always lower in the inertial model. The fact that wage inﬂ  ation is always lower with 
inertia implies that in a present discounted sense, output is further below potential than 
it is in the model without inertia.  POLICY DISCUSSION PAPERS  NUMBER 17, APRIL 2007
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*Simulations are hypothetical responses to a 30 percent oil price shock, given that future oil prices behave 
as they have in the past.
Sources: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis; U.S. Department of Labor, 
Bureau of Labor Statistics; Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, “Selected Interest 
Rates,”Federal Reserve Statistical Releases H.15; and authors’ calculations.
FIGURE 2  RESPONSE TO AN OIL SHOCK (STICKY PRICES AND STICKY WAGES)* (CONTINUED)
The differences between the output gap driven by sticky prices and that driven by 
sticky wages suggests that the latter may be crucial to the result that inertia appears to 
deliver better outcomes. A model with just sticky prices bears this out. Figure 3 graphs 
the outcomes for the model with only sticky prices. Inﬂ  ation was everywhere lower for 
the inertial Taylor rule in the model with both sticky prices and sticky wages. But with 
only sticky prices, inﬂ  ation is initially much higher for the inertial Taylor rule. Output and 
the output gap are initially higher as well. Because of the large inﬂ  ation jump, nominal 
interest rates in the ﬁ  rst few quarters after the energy shock are just as high for the in-
ertial rule as for the noninertial.   
The importance of inertial Taylor rules is reminiscent of the beneﬁ  ts of forward-look-
ing language in FOMC policy statements. With forward-looking language, the Fed moves 
today and signals where they intend to move in the future. Likewise, by inﬂ  uencing 
expectations, monetary policy operates off of both short- and long-term rates. An inertial 
Taylor rule basically states where the Fed moves today and where they are expected to 
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FIGURE 3  RESPONSE TO AN OIL SHOCK (STICKY PRICES ONLY)* (CONTINUED)
*Simulations are hypothetical responses to a 30 percent oil price shock, given that future oil prices behave 
as they have in the past.
Sources: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis; U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau 
of Labor Statistics; Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, “Selected Interest Rates,” Federal 
Reserve Statistical Releases, H.15; and authors’ calculations.
Conclusion 
This paper has shown that in a standard model with sticky wages and sticky prices, a Tay-
lor rule with inertia delivers better outcomes than the standard rule without inertia. This 
result, however, depends on the stickiness of wages relative to prices. Recent work by 
Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans suggests the importance of sticky wages in explaining 
business cycle ﬂ  uctuations. This lends support to the notion that the Fed implicitly fol-
lows an inertial Taylor rule because it delivers lower interest rates and inﬂ  ation without 
worsening output signiﬁ  cantly. In fact, for the ﬁ  rst several quarters following the oil price 

















Apart from adding oil to the production technology, the underlying model is fair-
ly standard.  See Woodford (2003) and Walsh (2003) for details. The theoretical model 
described here consists of households and ﬁ  rms; we present the decision problems of 
each in turn.  
Households
Households are inﬁ  nitely lived, discounting the future at rate β. Their period-by-period 

































+1  denotes real cash balances that can facilitate time-t transactions.  The 
household begins period t with Mt cash balances and Bt – 1 one-period nominal bonds 
that pay Rt – 1 gross interest.  With wt denoting the real wage, Pt the price level, and Xt the 
time-t monetary injection, the household’s intertemporal budget constraint is given by
PC B M M R B PwL X tt t t t t t t tt t ++ ≤ + + + +− − 11 1 .
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Following Erceg, Henderson, and Levin (2000), we assume that households are 
monopolistic suppliers of labor and that nominal wages are adjusted as in Calvo (1983).     
In this case, labor supply behavior is given by
CL Z h W tt tt
σγ= . 
 
It is easy to see that the wage elasticity of labor demand in this model is 1/ . γ   The 
variable Zht in this labor demand equation is the monopoly distortion as it measures 
the difference between the household’s marginal rate of substitution and the real wage.   
In the case of perfectly ﬂ  exible but monopolistic wages, Zht  = Zh  is constant and less 
than unity.  The smaller Zh is, the greater is the monopoly power.  In the case of sticky POLICY DISCUSSION PAPERS  NUMBER 17, APRIL 2007
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nominal wages, Zht  is variable and moves in response to the real and nominal shocks 
hitting the economy.  Erceg et al. (2000) demonstrate that in log deviations, nominal 
wage adjustment is given by
πλ β π t
ww
tt
w zh =+ +1,  
where πt
w is time-t net nominal wage growth, and zht denotes the log deviation from the 
steady state. 
Firms
The ﬁ  rms in the model utilize labor services, Lt, from households, and energy,  Et, from ex-
ternal sources to produce the ﬁ  nal good using the CES technology: 
Yf L E a L a E =≡ − + ⎡ ⎣ ⎤ ⎦
−− −
(, ) ( ) .
/( )
1
11 11 ρρ ρ
The real energy price is equal to πt
wso that a ﬁ  rm’s nominal proﬁ  ts are given by
profits P Y w L p E tt t t t
e
t =− − () .
The ﬁ  rm is a monopolistic producer of these goods, implying that labor will be paid 
below its marginal product.  Let Zt denote marginal cost so that we have
   wZ f t tt L = ()
  pZ f t t
e
tE = () .
The variable Zt is the monopoly distortion as it measures how far the ﬁ  rm’s marginal 
products differ from the real factor prices.  In the case of perfectly ﬂ  exible but monopo-
listic prices, Zt = Z is constant and less than unity.  The smaller Z is, the greater is the 
monopoly power.  In the case of sticky prices, Zt is variable and moves in response to 
the real and nominal shocks hitting the economy. Yun (1996) demonstrates that in log 
deviations, nominal price adjustment is given by
πλ β π ttt z =+ +1,    
where πt  is time-t nominal price growth (as a deviation from steady-state nominal price 
growth) and zt denotes the log deviation from the steady state.FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF CLEVELAND
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Equilibrium and Policy
There are four markets in this theoretical model: labor, goods, bonds, and money.  The re-
spective market-clearing conditions include CYp E ttt
e
t ==  and Bt = 0. The money mar-
ket clears with the household holding the per capita money supply intertemporally.
Calibration
Before proceeding with the analysis, we need to set parameter values consistent with 
empirical estimates for a quarterly model. Preference parameters are given by β = 09 9 .  
(implying a 4 percent annual steady-state real rate of return), σ = 2,  and γ = 3. The latter 
values are consistent with micro evidence of fairly inelastic savings and labor supply be-
havior.  Since monetary policy is given by an interest rate targeting procedure, the nature 
of money’s utility is irrelevant. Finally, we assume that prices and nominal wage levels can 
be adjusted on average every 2.9 quarters. Given the other preference parameters, this 
implies λ = 01 9 .  and λ
w = 0 0146 ..  For the model with sticky prices only λ
w =1000.
As for ﬁ  rms, the elasticity of substitution between oil and labor is equal to 1/ . ρ  Con-
sistent with empirical estimates, we set this elasticity to 0.59, or  ρ =17 ..  See Kim and 
Loungani (1992).  The share parameter, a, is set to 0.02. This implies a share of energy in 
total output of 6 percent (consistent with its share in 1989). 
The (logged) real price of oil is given by an exogenous AR(2) process:






t =++ −− 11 22 ε .
Estimating this process yields a1 = 1.12 and a2 = –15.  
  Finally, recall that monetary policy in the baseline experiment is given by
RR R y ts s t t y t =− + +− + − () () ( ) . 11 1 ρρ ρ τ π τ
Empirical evidence presented in Kozicki (2002) suggests that since 1983, the coef-
ﬁ  cients in this monetary policy rule are τ =14 4 .  and τ y = 01 4 ..   For the noninertial 
Taylor rule,  ρ = 0, whereas for the inertial Taylor rule,  ρ = 07 6 ..  POLICY DISCUSSION PAPERS  NUMBER 17, APRIL 2007
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